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Abstract
In many work and decision situations, realizing cooperation among individuals is important.
However, decision making environments of individuals are far from stable, resulting in
changes in task complexity and the social settings they encounter. We argue that past expe-
riences with cooperative behavior can result in different cooperative norms and expectations
about the behavior of others and will have an effect on an individual’s subsequent behavior
in new situations. This study experimentally investigates these dynamics of cooperative
behavior in social dilemmas and addresses the role of communication to provide empirical
evidence about a cognitive mechanism that may lead to these spillovers. Specifically, the
experimental design randomly assigns subjects to one type of repetitive interactions in the
first social dilemma (single partner or different partners) and we then examine how this
impacts the propensity to behave cooperatively in subsequent social dilemmas with unfamil-
iar partners (either single or different). Because of the variety in complexity of decision-mak-
ing environments in practice, we do so by examining behavioral spillovers across three
different social dilemmas that vary in difficulty to make cooperation successful. Our findings
show that individuals cooperate more during initial interactions with a single partner. More
importantly, this has positive spillover effects for subsequent behavior and communication,
even to settings without repeated interactions with a single partner. However, environmental
conditions affect the ability to transfer established norms of cooperation to subsequent in-
teractions, as an initially learned cooperative norm is gradually replaced by a more competi-
tive attitude when individuals start to interact with unfamiliar others in a setting in which
cooperative success is more difficult to achieve. Our findings illustrate the power of repeated
interactions for establishing and sustaining cooperation in other settings and enhance
understanding of how cooperative decisions can be shaped by both incentives and the
broader behavioral context of individuals.
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Introduction
Cooperation is traditionally formed to achieve goals that cannot be achieved by an individual
acting alone, and often requires individuals to efficiently combine and coordinate their
resources [1–3]. Fostering cooperation between individuals whose actions have strategic inter-
dependence can be problematic because of opportunistic behavior, especially when they do
not know each other and when it is difficult to communicate intentions or enforce cooperation
[4, 5]. In these social dilemmas where individual outcomes are also dependent on the decisions
of others, the interdependence structure among individuals is a key factor in predicting coop-
erative behavior [6]. Repeated interactions with the same individual make cooperation more
advantageous, while an awareness that the interaction is likely to end soon may induce unco-
operative behavior in the present [7]. In many organizational instances, though, these social
settings are rarely stable [2, 8, 9]. For instance, works team are often reassembled due to corpo-
rate restructuring, downsizing, voluntary career movement or reassignment of tasks [2, 10,
11], or are formed for a limited duration, such as a project team [8]. In addition, tasks often
differ in complexity while changing consumer preferences, new government regulations, or
new technologies can also require changes in decision practices to succeed. Sustaining cooper-
ation over time then not only requires individuals to condition their actions on the behavior of
unfamiliar others, but also to actively respond to changes in environmental conditions that
require different resource coordination strategies for cooperative success. In this study we
address this issue with data from a social dilemma laboratory experiment.
Dynamics in interaction settings allow for behavioral spillovers, where subsequent deci-
sions are influenced by individuals’ prior experiences [4, 9, 12–16]. Based on interdependence
theory [17] and organizational learning theory [18], we argue that the type of interaction in
one social dilemma (either a single partner or different partners) impacts individuals’ propen-
sity to behave cooperatively in subsequent social dilemmas with unfamiliar partners. We fur-
ther expect the persistence of this spillover effect to depend on environmental conditions,
which in our experiment are reflected by the contributions necessary to establish cooperative
success. Given the variety in complexity of decision-making environments in practice, we
examine cooperation spillovers across three social dilemmas that vary in difficulty of making
cooperation successful. Interactions characterized by greater strategic uncertainty, reflecting a
higher proportion of resources that individuals stand to lose if cooperation turns out to be
unsuccessful, are more demanding on individuals’ belief formation and produce a greater cog-
nitive load [4, 12]. We hypothesize that the extent to which individuals overcome these reser-
vations depends on initial experience. We also address a cognitive mechanism behind this
behavior. How individuals communicate with each other is expected to have an important
mediating role in this process, as it provides an opportunity to assess each other’s commitment
to cooperation, identify task requirements and coordinate on task interdependencies [19–21].
We implemented a 2x2 experimental design, crossing two types of initial experience (single
vs. different partners) with the same two types of subsequent experience to test our expecta-
tions. Participants were randomly assigned to the treatments and within their treatment were
randomly matched with another participant to create a dyad. All participants played three con-
secutive periods of repetitive interactions; one for initial experience and two for subsequent
experience. After each period, all participants were rematched with a new partner. Participants
could communicate with each other through an integrated chat box.
The main contribution of this study is to evaluate how individuals’ prior experiences and
communication tactics affect behavioral spillover effects across different decision-making
environments that vary in interdependence structures as well as the required decision-strategy
to be successful. We find that initial repeated interactions allow for the establishment of social
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norms of cooperation which can be sustained with other unfamiliar individuals, even without
repeated interactions. However, environmental conditions affect the ability to transfer estab-
lished social norms of cooperation to subsequent interactions, as an initially learned coopera-
tive norm is gradually replaced by a more competitive attitude when individuals start to
interact with unfamiliar others in a setting in which cooperative success is more difficult to
achieve. Our findings also illustrate the power of initial repeated interactions to establish and
sustain cooperation over time. Once cooperative norms have been routinized in the interac-
tion style of individuals, they seem to become more resilient to failures. Individuals are then
more likely to initially devote failures to environmental conditions and increase their coopera-
tive resource commitment, while individuals who initially interacted with different partners
are more likely to misinterpret failure as opportunistic behavior of their new partner, given
that they have experienced this before. Together, these results show how cooperative decisions
can be shaped by both incentives and the broader behavioral context of individuals and
enhance understanding of the persistence of cooperative spillover effects across different
settings.
Our results also have practical relevance as they can create awareness for managers about
spillover effects in the assignment of work activities to employees. Considering the sequences
of interaction settings helps to understand how assignment of tasks with varying complexity
and interdependence structures could be designed in order to improve performance.
Theoretical background
Uncertainties in social dilemmas
The conflict between competition and cooperation in interactions between interdependent
parties has been extensively examined through the lens of a social dilemma [22]. The key issue
surrounding social dilemmas is that individuals must pool resources to create synergistic
shared benefits, but once produced, these benefits can be enjoyed by everyone regardless of
their contribution level [23, 24]. Van Lange et al. ([25], p. 126) define the resulting social
dilemma as: “a situation in which a non-cooperative action is (at times) tempting for each indi-
vidual in that it yields superior (often short-term) outcomes for self, and if all pursue this non-
cooperative course of action, all are (often in the long-term) worse off than if all had cooper-
ated”. Highest collective and individual outcomes often occur when all partners choose to
cooperate, the dilemma is that for cooperative behavior to make sense individuals must believe
that the partner will cooperate as well [1, 24, 26–30]. Social dilemmas have frequently been
used to model situations within society at large that involve interdependent actions [22] (for
reviews see [25, 31]), but they can also model behavior in business contexts, both within firms
and between firms. For example, several studies [6, 19, 32] show that interfirm relationships,
such as alliances or joint-ventures, can be considered as social dilemmas. These collaborations
can provide a competitive advantage compared to other resource investments, but also present
several opportunities to behave opportunistically, the primary reason for collaborative failures
[33].
In a review of the literature about the effects of uncertainties on behavior in social dilem-
mas, Van Dijk et al. [34] distinguish two types of common uncertainties in real world social
dilemmas: uncertainty about whether partners will cooperate and uncertainties about charac-
teristics of the dilemma itself. Uncertainty about partners’ cooperative intentions refers to the
possibility that a partner is not committed to mutual interests [35], behavioral or social uncer-
tainty [2]. Uncertainties regarding the characteristics of the dilemma refer to environmental
uncertainties. Van Dijk et al. [34] consider the so-called provision threshold, the required
investment for successful cooperative activities, a primary environmental issue. This
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corresponds to real settings where the synergistic potential of collaboration cannot be specified
in advance [6, 25]. Prior studies have shown that behavioral and environmental uncertainty
independently reduce the willingness to cooperate [34]. Others conjecture that behavioral and
environmental uncertainty influence each other [36, 37]. For instance, individuals’ estimates
about others’ cooperativeness depends on the level of environmental uncertainty [29]. Hence,
individuals need to resolve these uncertainties for efficient coordination of resources and
cooperative success.
Prior studies on behavioral spillovers
No behavior exists in a vacuum, and decisions are often influenced by individuals’ prior expe-
riences [4, 12–16, 38–41]. This transfer of behavior is referred to as behavioral spillover. Behav-
ior can spill over when tasks are performed simultaneously [12, 42], or sequentially [4, 15, 38,
41, 43] and can have positive or negative effects on subsequent performance (for a review, see
[14]). Different types of learning can be the source of behavioral spillover. Individuals can
learn about the structural properties of their decision environment and transfer this to the con-
text they subsequently face or they can learn about the social preferences of others and refer to
these behavioral heuristics in subsequent interactions [4, 12, 16, 38, 41, 43, 44].
Experience from previous interactions has been shown to have an effect on future play in
other games, but most studies focus on the same groups playing related games in sequence [38,
41, 43, 45]. Another collection of studies investigates behavioral spillovers across different
environments, but not multiple social dilemmas [2, 4, 12]. As such, there is limited research on
what factors cause behavioral spillovers to occur across related settings when individuals need
to interact with unfamiliar others. Studies have shown that transfer of behavior generally
occurs in strategic interaction settings that are descriptively similar [4, 15, 39]. In addition,
decision-making environments in practice are far from stable. Individuals interact in many
different settings, sometimes repetitively with the same individual and sometimes with other
individuals, resulting in changing interdependence structures over time [8, 11]. In addition,
tasks often differ in complexity while changing consumer preferences, new government regu-
lations, or new technologies can also require changes in decision practices to succeed. We thus
contribute to this literature on behavioral spillovers by considering behaviors that take place
sequentially and are structurally linked by the same underlying task principle of individuals,
however characterized by different interdependence structures and difficulty in being success-
ful (e.g. different provision thresholds). Specifically, we examine how individuals respond to a
new interdependence structure and required changes in decision practices to succeed and
whether their behavior differs depending on their prior interdependence structure. We exam-
ine this expected difference in behavior informed by different types of experience by an out-
come-based measure, performance, as recommended by Argote and Miron-Spektor [46]. In
traditional social dilemma research, the term cooperation is used to reflect choices favoring
collective interests over individual interests [22, 32]. In our study, we focus on how individuals
figure out the details of efficiently implementing cooperation with partners. Cooperative
choices in social dilemmas can be inefficient and costly for individuals when the partner does
not contribute (sufficiently) to cooperation, while free-riding on a partner’s cooperative con-
tributions can be efficient and beneficial for individuals. We therefore do not focus on cooper-
ative choices but on individual performance (e.g. payoffs).
Interdependence structure
Organizational learning theory considers experience as fundamental for learning [18]. Argote
and Miron-Spektor [46] argue that learning from experience interacts with context to create
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knowledge. Knowledge acquired through learning is embedded in the context and this affects
future learning and behavior [4, 12, 47]. In social dilemmas, the context is primarily created by
the features of the decision-making environment, in other words the interdependence of deci-
sions that determine outcomes. Interdependency theory describes how individuals can affect
another’s outcomes during the course of an interaction [17]. Since social dilemmas tempt indi-
viduals to behave non-cooperatively in the short-term with the consequence of being worse off
in the long-term, the awareness of possible future encounters can have a strong influence on
their behavior [6, 25]. Concerns about future consequences (e.g. the shadow of the future) can
affect whether individuals choose to maximize the long-term or short-term consequences of
their actions [16, 26, 30, 44, 48–51] and whether they trust the cooperative intentions of others
[21]. Hence, single interactions or repeated interactions can impact the willingness to cooper-
ate and the ability to familiarize and learn from others.
Several studies on individual learning have examined individual outcomes based on two
different work-design related strategies: specialization and variety [52–54]. These studies show
that specialization allows to capture the benefits of repetition while variety in task content is
considered to keep individuals more motivated and provides them with more opportunities to
learn. The potential gains of motivation and learning attributed to heterogeneous experiences
are considered to be especially relevant for the long term when conditions change, as variety in
prior experiences increase the likelihood that new situations can be related to what is already
known [55]. However, studies have shown that switching tasks initially worsens individual
performance because of cognitive switching costs [54, 56]. We do not examine a variety of
tasks but expect variety in task context (e.g. interdependence) to have a similar effect. Multiple
single interactions create heterogeneous experience with different individuals, while repeated
interactions induce more homogenous experience. During interdependent decision-making,
learning is not just individual learning about advantages and disadvantages of cooperative and
non-cooperative behavior, which can simply be transferred to interactions with other individ-
uals. Cooperation must be enacted and sustained in the interaction with others. When only
one individual understands the benefits of cooperation, the outcome can be disastrous for that
individual as cooperating also bears the greatest risks [32]. During interactions with different
partners, there is a continuous need to assess cooperative intentions of the other party. This
continuous suspicion of opportunistic behavior breeds distrust and decreases confidence in
cooperative success in the future, even in the absence of opportunistic intentions by any of the
partners [44, 47, 57]. Consequently, we expect that the learning potential of interactions with
different partners is hard to materialize without prior experience how to cooperate. Repeated
interactions with the same partner provide a stable relationship where the value of future inter-
actions provides a long-term orientation [44, 49]. This increases reciprocal decisions between
individuals and facilitates the development of trust and cooperative norms between individuals
[15, 21]. We thus hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a). In repetitive interdependent decisions, initial interactions with a
single partner result in higher performance than initial interactions with different partners.
Communication
Simply observing outcomes of choice behavior does not reveal the cognitive mechanisms
behind this behavior [31]. Cooperation not only exists when individuals’ goals are related or
better aligned, but also because they coordinate and work together to achieve these goals. Indi-
viduals need to learn how to assess each other’s commitment to cooperation, identify task
requirements and coordinate on task interdependencies. Communication provides the oppor-
tunity to share this knowledge, as it allows to highlight shared interests and common goals,
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recognize and share opportunities for improvement, make commitments about own behavior
or demonstrate cooperative intent [19–21, 58, 59]. Hence, we examine how communication
content mediates the effect of interdependence structure on performance. Most studies that
examine how communication content influences cooperative behavior distinguish distributive
and integrative communication [58]. In our study, we label these communication tactics as
non-cooperative and cooperative. Non-cooperative communication is focused on maximizing
individual outcomes, while cooperative communication seeks to establish coordination through
accurate information exchange with the intent to realize the interests of both partners. The rela-
tive extent of cooperative communication will thus positively affect cooperative behavior. How-
ever, when there is a higher likelihood that the other party uses shared information for its own
benefit instead of for the collective, individuals are less likely to reveal their cooperative inten-
tions or communicate truthfully [21] and less likely to attend to information they receive [60].
Together, this reduces the possibility to create consensus and integrate perspectives. On the
contrary, repeated interactions provide a motivation to build a reputation for honestly revealing
intentions and private information, thus making communication efficiency enhancing [61].
Hypothesis 1b (H1b). The effect of initial interdependence structure on performance is
positively mediated by cooperative communication.
Lower threshold value and subsequent interdependence
A new interdependence structure, with an unfamiliar individual, can make individuals less
willing to contribute to the cooperation without previous evidence of the other party’s cooper-
ative willingness [62]. We hypothesize that overcoming these initial reservations is dependent
on initial experience. With initial experience from interactions with a single partner, individu-
als have learned how to cooperate efficiently [4]. Studies show that repetitive interactions with
a single partner result in establishing a cooperative norm, which does not emerge when inter-
acting with different partners [16, 38, 44]. However, Duffy and Ochs [44] also report a dra-
matic decline in cooperative behavior of individuals after a switch from fixed pairing to
random matching. On the other hand, Cason et al. [4] and Peysakhovich and Rand [16] show
that individuals’ belief formation and choice behavior in new strategic situations with other
individuals is based on norms formed in similar past situations. In addition, Engle-Warnick
and Slonim [63] show that individuals are more likely to start cooperating in a new group after
a long than after a short initial match. Cooperative commitment and norms from prior inter-
actions thus can lower perceived uncertainty of the new environment and promote adaptive
behavior [4, 15]. We expect that individuals who have learned to cooperate with a single part-
ner can develop a social norm of cooperation that can persist with others, because of the lower
threshold value during subsequent interactions. Their prior cooperative routines are still suc-
cessful, which confirms their expectation of cooperative intentions of their new partners. In
addition, they learn that the lower threshold value reduces their exposure risk (i.e. the propor-
tion of the total amount of resources that individuals stand to lose if the cooperation turns out
to be unsuccessful) which further increases the prospect of cooperative benefits [49]. During
subsequent interactions with a lower threshold value, we expect that individuals who initially
interacted with a single partner are not likely to shift from a cooperative norm to a competitive
attitude when interacting repetitively with different partners.
Initial experience with different partners creates skepticism about intentions of others and
elicits a more competitive norm, which makes it difficult to foresee value in cooperative inter-
actions [44, 63]. As such, they are less likely to learn that the exposure risk is significantly
lower, which further increases their initial competitive orientation [47]. However, when indi-
viduals start to interact repetitively with a single partner after initial interactions with different
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partners, this should lower the perceived risk of opportunistic behavior by the partner and
they will be more inclined toward cooperation compared to individuals that continue to inter-
act with different partners [49]. Zeng and Chen [32] argue that the shift from short-term to
long-term thinking occurs when individuals realize the importance of cooperation based on
an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of cooperative and non-cooperative
behavior. This is underlined by Duffy and Ochs [44], who show that a norm of non-coopera-
tion after interacting with different partners is directly replaced with a cooperative one after a
switch to a single partner. Recognition of the value of successful cooperation increases the will-
ingness to further align cooperative decisions with their new partner. As such, we expect that
individuals who initially interacted with different partners need time to adapt to an environ-
ment where the risk of opportunistic behavior is lower but will do this better and faster when
they have repetitive interactions with a single partner than with different partners.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a). During subsequent repetitive interactions with a lower threshold
value, initial and/or subsequent interactions with a single partner lead to higher performance
than initial and subsequent interactions with different partners.
A social norm of (non-)cooperation can be a precedent that increases or decreases an indi-
vidual’s subsequent cooperative choices [4, 15, 41, 44], but a cooperative norm does not always
increase cooperation [32]. A new decision environment requires sharing information and pro-
cessing of information in order to adapt behavior and decisions. We thus hypothesize that
cooperative communication mediates the behavioral spillover effect.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b). The behavioral spillover effect of initial experience on subsequent
performance during interactions with a lower threshold value is mediated by cooperative
communication.
Higher threshold value and subsequent interdependence
Interactions characterized by more strategic uncertainty are more demanding on individuals’
belief formation and produce greater cognitive load [4, 12]. This reduces the likelihood that
individuals contribute to the cooperation, out of fear that others will not contribute [29]. A
higher threshold value will hence initially increase the likelihood of cooperative failures. We
expect that the attribution of this cooperative failure will differ across individuals, depending
on their initial experience. Individuals mitigate uncertainty in their decision environment via
information on how referent others acted before. Hyndman et al. [21] show that fixed pairings
create opportunities for learning and adjustment, but individuals are just as likely to learn that
they are a bad match for each other. Individuals who initially interacted with different partners
are more likely to misinterpret failure as opportunistic behavior of their new partner, given
that they have experienced this before [59, 64]. Cooperative failure re-activates their initial
competitive mindset and the likelihood that they classify their new partner as untrustworthy.
They will start protect themselves from being exploited at the expense of finding a mutual solu-
tion to adapt to the new environment. Individuals that have experienced consistent coopera-
tive intentions of partners develop a social norm of cooperation [44]. Cooperation becomes
more routinized as a decision heuristic, which makes it more resilient to failures [5]. They will
initially devote failures to environmental conditions and increase their cooperative resource
commitment. Performance of individuals interacting with a single partner during subsequent
interactions with a higher threshold value is thus expected to be higher when they have initial
experience from interactions with a single partner than with different partners. We also expect
that this hypothesized effect is mediated by communication.
For individuals who interact with different partners during subsequent interactions with a
higher threshold value, we expect no performance difference based on their initial experience.
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Bereby-Meyer and Roth [47] show that in a complex environment, behavior becomes more
dependent on what actions others are choosing. A higher threshold value increases the risk of
cooperation failure and makes the exposure risk more pronounced [29]. It will become diffi-
cult to maintain a social norm of cooperation that persists when interacting with different
partners in a more competitive setting [44]. Individuals will lose confidence in cooperative
benefits, infer that partners are increasingly pursuing self-interests, and consequently will
become more competitive themselves.
Hypothesis 3a (H3a). During subsequent repetitive interactions with a higher threshold
value, initial and subsequent interactions with a single partner lead to higher performance
than initial and/or subsequent interactions with different partners.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b). The behavioral spillover effect of initial experience on subsequent
performance during interactions with a higher threshold value is mediated by cooperative
communication.
Method
Ethics statement
This study and its consent procedure were approved by the Research Ethics Review Board of
the Vrije Universiteit’s School of Business and Economics. Informed verbal consent from the
participants was taken prior to data collection and all participants were debriefed. The verbal
consent procedure involved informing the participants about the nature, purpose and
intended use of the results of the study. Verbal consent was considered to be sufficient, since it
was ensured that data were stored and analyzed anonymously. All subjects were given a unique
anonymous identification number for privacy protection. In addition, the experiment was
non-invasive and participation was voluntary, with the opportunity to decide whether or not
to take part in the study.
Experimental game
We use a social dilemma game, in which cooperation is modeled as a public goods assurance
dilemma. Assurance dilemmas are unique because highest collective and individual outcomes
occur when both partners choose to cooperate [25, 31]. This correspondence of joint and own
outcomes might suggest that the solution is simple and hence there is no dilemma. However,
in assurance public goods dilemmas all members must contribute or the public good is not
produced [29, 65]. The dilemma is that for contributing to the cooperation (public good) to
make sense, individuals must believe that the others will cooperate as well [32, 66]. In addition,
public goods dilemmas provide a temptation to under-contribute toward the public good and
free-ride on contributions of others, as once produced, the benefits of public goods can be
enjoyed by everyone regardless of contribution level [24]. For this, we use a threshold value
(provision point) such that cooperation is only successful (e.g. the public good provided) if vol-
untary contributions exceed the required threshold level of contributions [29, 66]. This thresh-
old value is higher than the amount of resources under control of an individual, supporting
the principle that successful cooperation requires investments of both partners, but does not
require investment of an individual’s full amount of resources. This specifically tempts individ-
uals to exploit others’ cooperative efforts by free riding on their investments. We further
increased the tension between competitive and cooperative behavior by allowing individuals
to obtain private benefits from their partners’ cooperative resource investment when coopera-
tion turned out to be unsuccessful (total cooperative resource investment below provision
point). This incentive quantifies that cooperative relationships also provide an opportunity to
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gain private benefits once acquired knowledge, resources or skills of partners are leveraged in
areas unrelated to the cooperation [6].
Each participant in the experiment played the role of a firm manager making decisions
about the allocation of resources with the objective to create profits for their firm. The partici-
pants decided on allocating their controlled resources towards individual production activities,
which would generate profits privately to them, and towards cooperative production activities,
which could generate profits for them and their partner. For each allocation decision (each
round within a game) they had to allocate the full amount of their controlled resources, but
they had full discretion in how they allocated resources. Participants had two and a half min-
utes for each round to make their decision. Supporting information ‘S1 Appendix’ provides a
full copy of the experimental task instructions provided to the participants.
To induce proper incentives that represent a threshold assurance dilemma, the profits for
the participants within a dyad were calculated as follows. For every decision round, both play-
ers received a fixed amount of 150 resources to invest. For each resource invested in individual
production activities, a player received 1.000 Experimental Euros (E€) of profit, which were
private profits. To make cooperative activities successful, a minimum amount of resources, the
threshold value, was required. Participants were not informed about the value of this threshold
in any game. If total investment in cooperative activities was above the threshold value, the
partners received a fixed bonus of 500.000 E€. This bonus was equally shared between both
players (250.000 E€ each) regardless of their respective resource investments. All resources
invested above the threshold yielded an additional total profit of 200 E€ (100 E€ for each part-
ner) per resource. Investments in cooperative production activities below the threshold did
not yield any cooperative profits (i.e. zero bonus and no common return per unit of resource
invested). Players received 500 E€ private profit per resource invested in unsuccessful coopera-
tive production activities by their partner. The threshold values were set at 198 resources in
game one, 158 in game two and 238 in game three. This sequence of threshold values refers to
the sequence in our hypotheses. A higher (lower) threshold value requires a higher (lower)
cooperative resource commitment by partners, making cooperative investments more (less)
risky and cooperative success more (less) difficult to achieve. To further clarify the tensions
between cooperation and non-cooperation that are created with these incentives, supporting
information ‘S2 Appendix’ provides more detail about the payoffs that could be obtained with
a variety of investment outcomes (e.g. full cooperative contribution, no cooperative contribu-
tion, contributing exactly the threshold) given the incentives and specific game characteristics.
Participants received feedback about their own investment decision, whether the coopera-
tion was successful, their own profit from individual production activities and total round
profit, and their own cumulative profit for the respective game. To avoid reputational effects,
we did not provide participants with actual investment decisions or profits of their partners in
prior rounds or games. Participants received information regarding the last round played and
were not able to review information from prior rounds. With this information participants
could learn how to adapt their resource allocations. When cooperation failed, they could calcu-
late exactly how much their partner invested in cooperative production activities by subtract-
ing their individual production activities profit from their total round profit. After successful
cooperation, participants were able to calculate the total overinvestment in cooperative pro-
duction activities, by subtracting their individual production activities profit and share of the
fixed bonus from their total round profit. In both scenarios (failure and success), participants
could not individually calculate the exact threshold value. For this, they needed to share accu-
rate and reliable information with each other about their resource investment decisions and
profits. The integrated chat box provided the opportunity to do this.
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Experimental design and treatments
The entire experiment was computerized, using a web-application developed for this experi-
ment. The experiment was divided into three games and a game consisted of a fixed number
of seven rounds. To avoid endgame effects participants were informed that the experimental
session constituted a series of games with each game divided into a number of rounds. Within
a session, each game started at the same time for all participants and they all played the three
games sequentially in the same order. Each round within a game started at the same time for
both partners in the dyad, and decisions within a dyad were made simultaneously.
We implemented a 2x2 experimental design, crossing two types of initial experience with
two types of subsequent experience. Participants were randomly assigned to the treatments and
within a treatment were randomly matched with another participant to create a dyad. We varied
the matching protocol to create dyads wherein participants interacted repeatedly with the same
partner or had repetitive interactions with different partners. Before the start of each game, par-
ticipants were informed that they would be matched with the same partner in every round of a
game or that they would be matched with a partner for one round and paired with another part-
ner each subsequent round. The interaction mode in game one determined initial experience of
participants. Subsequent experience is represented by the second and third game. Half of the
participants continued interacting in the same type of interaction mode, the other half changed
from single partner interaction mode to different partners interaction mode or vice versa. This
switch in matching protocol was not announced in advance. Each participant, irrespective of
treatment, was matched with a new partner at the start of each new game. During each round of
a game, participants were allowed to communicate with each other.
Procedures and participants
One hundred and sixty-six (166) students participated in one of five sessions (number of par-
ticipants per session: 46 (1); 20 (2); 30 (3); 32 (4); 38 (5)). Each session lasted approximately 75
minutes and each subject participated in only one session. All students were recruited from
the Accounting and Control program at a large Dutch university. We recruited both third-
year Bachelor students as well as Master students. The majority of students were male (118
male; 48 female) and most students were enrolled in the full-time program (128 full-time; 38
part-time). Gender and educational background (Bachelor vs. Master) did not have any signif-
icant effects on the outcome variables and are excluded from further analyses. Part-time stu-
dents participated in a separate session (5). Part-time Master students in our experiment work
four days a week as an accountant or controller. Their experiences and day-to-day activities
differ from those of full-time students which can influence their behavior in the experiment as
well. We control for performance difference in further analyses by including a dummy variable
for part-time students. Participants earned a show up fee (€ 2.25) with additional compensa-
tion based on their performance during the experiment. At the end of the experimental ses-
sion, experiment euro’s earned were converted to real euro’s at the rate of E€ 1 = € 0.000001.
Total compensation was paid in cash directly after the experimental session (on average €6.89,
min = €4.63, max = €8.40).
Participants arrived at the computer lab and were randomly assigned to computer terminals
that were divided with cubicles, to prohibit face-to-face interaction between participants. Brief
general instructions were read aloud, all further instructions were provided on the computer
screens once participants logged in on the web-application. Hard-copy instructions were pro-
vided as well.
As we focus on individual participants in our experiment, individual-level properties can
affect their decision-making as well. We examine a setting where participants can make
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decisions that are risk-free (individual production investment) or risky (cooperative produc-
tion investment) and the task provides participants with an incentive to free ride on the invest-
ment of partners. Prior studies show that individuals have different attitudes to risks [67] and
social motives [68, 69]. In order to control for these individual differences, participants started
with two questionnaires to assess their risk-aversion and social value orientation using instru-
ments adopted from Holt and Laury [67] and Van Lange et al. [68]. Untabulated analyses
show that scores on these variables do not significantly differ across the treatment groups and
results of the statistical analyses that control for these individual attributes do not affect the
results of our hypothesis testing. We excluded these variables from further analyses. To exclude
framing effects of the instruments used to measure risk attitude and social value orientation on
the main task, participants completed a distraction task (formulating words based on a string
of letters) before they were provided with information about the experimental task.
Instructions first explained the decisions participants were asked to make and potential
payoffs. Then the main screen of the application (where to enter allocation decisions, find out-
comes from prior interactions and how to communicate with the partner) was presented and
explained. Before the start of their task, each participant had to answer questions to test their
comprehension on different aspects of the task. An incorrect answer on any of the questions
directed participants to explanatory computer screens, to ensure understanding of the relevant
aspects and payoff calculations of the task. After completing this comprehension quiz, manip-
ulations were introduced and the first game started. Manipulation check questions asked par-
ticipants after each game to indicate if they were matched with a single partner or with
different partners during the last game played. Respectively 16 (9.6%), 11 (6.6%) and 16 (9.6%)
participants failed to correctly answer this question for game one, two and three. Five partici-
pants failed on more than one of these questions, which we considered as a manipulation
check failure. These participants were excluded from further analyses, however their inclusion
did not affect the results of our hypotheses testing. To ensure that participants could not be
held up indefinitely by others, there was a time limit for each round. Participants had two and
a half minutes in each round to make their resource investment decision. When participants
failed to invest within that time, the computer automatically filed an investment of 0 in both
individual and cooperative production. One participant was excluded for the analyses of game
one and game two and one was excluded for the analyses of only game one, as these partici-
pants failed to invest in more than 3 of the 7 rounds within a game, indicating a lack of under-
standing how to perform their task in the particular games only or insufficient attention in
these games. Their inclusion did not affect the results of our hypothesis testing. At the end of
the experimental session, participants completed an exit questionnaire.
Variable definitions
Traditionally, the term cooperation is used in social dilemma studies to reflect choices favoring
collective over individual interests [22]. In our study, we focus on how individuals figure out
the details of implementing cooperation. The characteristics of the game imply that contribut-
ing to cooperation can be very inefficient and costly for individuals when the partner does not
contribute to cooperation, while free-riding on a partner’s cooperative contributions can be
efficient and beneficial for individuals. In addition, if individuals contribute all their resources
to cooperation, they are worse off than if both contribute just at the threshold amount. As
such, we focus on individual payoffs as our dependent variable, measured as a participant’s
total profit divided by the cooperative optimal profit. We standardize profits to make them
more comparable across games as the varying threshold values for successful cooperation per
game determine the potential maximum profit. We define cooperative optimal profit as the
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profit obtained when the threshold value for successful cooperation is exactly invested through
equal resource investments. This standardization is considered appropriate as input equality
increases the sustainability of cooperation. Equity theory predicts that individuals will attempt
to restore equity when they perceive being treated unfairly or unequally [70], leading to con-
flicts, less commitment to cooperation and lower cooperative profits. Reported standardized
profits reflect the percentage of realized cooperative optimal profits.
The independent variables include the indicator variables for each of the two treatments. Ini-
tial experience is a dummy variable, with a value of 0 for participants that have a single partner
in every round of game one and a value of 1 for participants with a different partner in every
round in game one. Subsequent experience is a dummy variable, with a value of 0 for partici-
pants that have a single partner during game two and a new but single partner during game
three and a value of 1 for participants that have different partners within game two and three.
We measure communication as the proportion of cooperative tactics used within a game by
dividing the number of coded cooperative tactics with the sum of cooperative and non-cooper-
ative tactics coded in a game. We focus on individual decision-making in interdependent
interactions and how this behavior is influenced by the communication individuals use and
hence choose the individual participant as the unit of analysis. We coded all messages that par-
ticipants exchanged with each other through the chat box using a coding scheme. We examine
a setting where individuals only need to coordinate on their investment in either individual or
cooperative production activities, whereas most studies that code communication provide a
setting where partners have to negotiate on multiple issues. The definitions of our cooperative
and non-cooperative codes are developed based on prior studies that have coded communica-
tion into distributive and integrative behavior categories [71], but were adapted for the specific
characteristics of our single item coordination task into cooperative and non-cooperative cate-
gories. Communication can be used for assessing the willingness of partners and self-disclo-
sure of willingness to cooperate [19–21]. De Dreu et al. [71] argue that coordination
agreements that increase profits require that partners integrate each other’s interests and per-
spectives, which involves the exchange of accurate information. Communication can further
enhance profits when used to coordinate on investments and when it creates the necessary
social capital since partners interact in an environment with non-binding agreements. We
build on these four different communication objects (willingness to cooperate, information
exchange, coordinating decision, and creating atmosphere) and developed an equal number of
cooperative and non-cooperative tactics within these categories (total of 20 codes, see Table 1).
We coded neutral tactics separately, to account for the statements exchanged between part-
ners that are unlikely to have a directional influence, such as off-task talk. We also coded
Table 1. Communication coding scheme.
Object Cooperative tactics Non-cooperative tactics
Willingness to cooperate Request cooperation (RC)
Self-disclosure cooperative intentions (SDI)
Refusal to cooperate (RFC)
Putdowns (PD)
Information exchange Request for information (RI)
Provision of information (PI)
Refusal share information (RFI)
Lies about information (LI)
Coordinating
decision
Request for proposal (RP)
Proposal (PROP)
Prediction positive rewards (PPR)
Promise (PRO)
Counterproposal (CPROP)
Persuasive argument (PA)
Prediction unpleasant consequence (UC)
Lies about decision (LD)
Creating atmosphere Positive result reaction (PRR)
Positive reactions (PR)
Negative result reaction (NRR)
Negative reactions (NR)
Neutral tactics
Miscellaneous (e.g. off-task talk, attempts to identify partner or confusion about game characteristics (N))
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213038.t001
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‘greetings’ and ‘request for proposal’ as a separate code but excluded these codes from further
analyses on communication tactics used. A request for proposal asks a partner to propose how
to invest the resources, but it is impossible to assess if and how participants use this as a tactic
to influence the behavior of the partner. The first author and three research assistants that
were blind to the conditions and hypotheses of this study performed coding independently.
We calculated Cohen’s Kappa to assess inter-rater reliability. Inter-rater agreements varied
between 0.739 and 0.805, which we consider sufficient. The first author produced a single set
of codes for each participant in which all disagreements between coders were resolved. The
analyses on communication tactics is based on this last set of codes. We compressed approxi-
mately 13.115 messages into 8.433 codes (including request for proposal and greetings), and
coded 5.298 cooperative, 1.555 non-cooperative, and 292 neutral tactics.
We also examine differences in perceptions of partner behavior to assess if these converge
with our theoretical arguments. After each game, participants were asked to assess the behavior
of their partner(s) on a 7-point scale (1 competitive; 7 cooperative). We report this variable as
perception of partner behavior and use it to examine if this differs across treatment conditions.
We further validated our content-based coding of communication with the perception of part-
ner behavior variable. For each participant we calculated the proportion of cooperative com-
munication used by its partner(s) in a particular game and related this to the assessments of
partner behavior provided by the participants. If participants had different partners within a
game, we first calculated the proportion of cooperative communication used by the partners
per round and then used the average for the game. Correlations between the two measures are
positive and significant for the three games (0.445; 0.499; 0.463), supporting validity of the
coding-based measurement.
Finally, participants had a maximum amount of time per round to make their decisions,
and thus had to coordinate decisions with their partners in a timely fashion. We measured the
amount of time for decision-making as the sum of time (in seconds) used in all seven rounds
within a game to assess efficiency of decision making.
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations
Descriptive statistics and correlations presented in Table 2 indicate an increase in average
game profits in game two (0.817 vs. 0.654) and a subsequent decrease in game three (0.730 vs.
0.817). The lowest threshold value for successful cooperation in game two explains this pattern.
Average profits in game three are higher than in game one (0.730 vs. 0.654; t-statistic = 4.606,
p = 0.000), despite the higher threshold value, indicating an overall task learning effect. The
averages of proportion of cooperative communication are relatively stable over the three
games, 0.735, 0.792 and 0.776. Proportion of cooperative communication is positively corre-
lated with game profits (0.422 game one; 0.421 game two; 0.354 game three), indicating that
participants using more cooperative communication realized higher profits. Inefficiency in
decision making is associated with lower profits as shown by the correlations between time
and profit for the respective games (-0.077; -0.222; -0.348). Perception of cooperative partner
behavior correlates positively with game profit (0.564; 0.546; 0.629), and negatively with time
(-0.094; -0.189; -0.226), indicating that perceived cooperativeness of partners makes decision
making more profitable and efficient.
Hypothesis testing
Hypothesis 1a posits that initial repetitive interactions with a single partner result in higher
performance than initial repetitive interactions with different partners. We used standardized
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profit per round as the dependent variable, partnering condition as the between-subjects factor
and round (7 rounds per game) as the within-subjects factor in our hypothesis tests. We tested
hypothesis 1a based on the results of game one only. Table 3 provides accompanying descrip-
tive statistics on the round profits per treatment group (Panel A) and the results of the repeated
measures ANOVA (Panel B). During initial repetitive transactions, interactions with a single
partner have a beneficial effect on profits (0.696 vs. 0.616) and this effect is statistically signifi-
cant (F = 11.159, p = 0.001). This provides support for hypothesis 1a. Participants that interact
with a single partner also communicate more cooperatively (0.775 vs. 0.699, p = 0.037), per-
ceive their partner as more cooperative (6.09 vs. 4.71, p = 0.000) and use less time to make
their decisions (524.75 vs. 629.06, p = 0.000). This underlines that interactions with a single
partner are more trustworthy, and provide an opportunity to coordinate faster and more effi-
ciently. Panel B reveals a significant main effect of round (F = 24.066, p = 0.000), but no inter-
action effect between round and partnering condition (F = 1.630, p = 0.138).
We used structural equation modeling to test for mediation effects of communication con-
tent. Structural equation modeling provides the opportunity to simultaneously estimate direct
and indirect effects, which is impossible with ANOVA. We used SPSS AMOS with maximum
likelihood estimation and bootstrap resampling (5000) to estimate the significance of the indi-
rect effects. We report direct, indirect and total effects of our variables of interest. In the medi-
ation analyses we use the average profit across the rounds in the game per subject as the
dependent variable and consider this as one independent observation. This is a standard prac-
tice in management and organization sciences [2].
Mediation results for game one reported in Panel A of Table 4, show that the total effect of
initial experience on profits (-0.079, p = 0.002, CI:[-0.126;-0.033]) is partly mediated by the
proportion of cooperative communication, indicated by the significant indirect effect (-0.020,
p = 0.028, CI:[-0.042;-0.002]). This shows that the negative effect of interactions with different
partners is partly explained by a lower proportion of cooperative communication used, and
provides support for hypothesis 1b.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Game I profit 0.145 0.128 0.480 -0.071 -0.012 -0.025 -0.097 -0.131 0.568 0.018 0.072
2 Game II profit 0.173 0.283 0.298 0.380 0.218 -0.024 -0.208 -0.218 0.180 0.446 0.237
3 Game III profit 0.159 0.272 0.269 0.278 0.447 -0.063 -0.111 -0.320 0.262 0.381 0.662
4 Prop. coop. com. game I 0.422 0.384 0.308 0.317 0.321 -0.173 -0.160 -0.131 0.425 0.205 0.197
5 Prop. coop. com. game II -0.030 0.421 0.247 0.397 0.619 -0.093 -0.231 -0.207 0.117 0.471 0.299
6 Prop. coop. com. game III 0.051 0.262 0.354 0.373 0.642 -0.173 -0.096 -0.203 0.158 0.360 0.399
7 Time game I -0.077 -0.038 -0.076 -0.015 -0.038 -0.114 0.405 0.396 -0.134 -0.103 -0.162
8 Time game II -0.130 -0.222 -0.117 -0.114 -0.147 -0.060 0.404 0.559 -0.027 -0.261 -0.158
9 Time game III -0.160 -0.200 -0.348 -0.120 -0.150 -0.150 0.373 0.574 -0.090 -0.276 -0.283
10 Perception partner game I 0.564 0.182 0.260 0.413 0.161 0.189 -0.094 -0.038 -0.096 0.213 0.260
11 Perception partner game II 0.019 0.546 0.339 0.268 0.543 0.395 -0.100 -0.189 -0.223 0.143 0.574
12 Perception partner game III 0.069 0.210 0.629 0.194 0.315 0.383 -0.158 -0.131 -0.226 0.236 0.565
Mean 0.654 0.817 0.730 0.735 0.792 0.776 579.20 514.80 426.71 5.37 5.66 5.23
Std. deviation 0.154 0.163 0.166 0.237 0.227 0.226 164.04 171.50 148.49 1.95 1.93 1.93
Min. 0.237 0.134 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.000 126 159 117 1 1 1
Max. 0.990 1.100 1.036 1.000 1.000 1.000 1024 1009 777 7 7 7
Pearson correlation coefficient below the diagonal and Spearman’s Rho above the diagonal. Significant correlations (p<0.05) are displayed bold.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213038.t002
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Table 5 reports the results for game two. We find a significant interaction effect between
initial experience and subsequent experience, indicating that the type of prior experience influ-
ences participants’ performance in subsequent interactions (F = 11.978, p = 0.001). We per-
formed post hoc pairwise comparisons to test for simple main effects and provide additional
results on the effect proposed in hypothesis 2a (see Panel C of Table 5). These results show that
participants who initially interacted with different partners and continue with different part-
ners in game two perform significantly lower than all three other treatment groups, while
there are no significant differences in profit between the other three treatment groups. During
subsequent interactions with a lower threshold value, participants who have learned how to
cooperate with a single partner during their prior experience are thus able to also exploit this
capability with unfamiliar partners. An explanation for how they exploit this capability is their
use of cooperative communication, which is comparable to the communication used by partic-
ipants that continue to interact with a single partner (0.846 vs. 0.834). Our results also show
that a new relationship with a single partner creates recognition of the benefits of being
Table 3. Results on profits for partnering treatments game I.
Panel A–Descriptive statistics
Initial experience
Round Single partner
(n = 76)
Different partners
(n = 83)
1 0,461 0,398
2 0,569 0,591
3 0,704 0,577
4 0,733 0,609
5 0,765 0,630
6 0,775 0,747
7 0,863 0,762
Standardized game profit 0,696
(0,158)
0,616
(0,141)
Proportion cooperative communication 0,775
(0,258)
0,699
(0,211)
Perception behavior partner 6,09
(1,643)
4,71
(1,990)
Time used for decision making 524,75
(171,54)
629,06
(140,26)
Panel B–Repeated measures ANOVA on Game I profits
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p
Between Subjects
Initial experience 1,751 1 1,751 11,159 0,001
Error 24,476 156 0,157
Within Subjects effects
Round 12,416 5,820 2,133 24,066 0,000
Round x Initial experience 0,841 5,820 0,145 1,630 0,138
Error (rounds) 80,484 907,916
Covariate
Part_time 0,033 1 0,033 0,208 0,649
In Panel A, the cells contain information regarding the number of individuals per condition (n), the average scores, and (standard deviation). Two-tailed p-values are
reported in Panel B.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213038.t003
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cooperative, which seems to mitigate skepticism about cooperative intentions of partners that
could have been develop during initial interactions with different partners.
For game two we examine the mediating effects of both communication content and the
perception of partner behavior in the prior game, as additional test of our theoretical argu-
ments (Panel B, Table 4). We argued that if prior experiences are considered as (non) coopera-
tive, this can have positive (negative) spillover effects to subsequent interactions. As such,
behavior in game two can be conditioned on how a participant perceived the prior partner’s
behavior. We find that perceived cooperativeness of partners in the first game has an indirect
positive effect on profit, which is significant at the 10% level (0.003, p = 0.081, CI: [0.000;
0.009].
The interaction between initial and subsequent experience has a significant effect on pro-
portion of cooperative communication (-0.198, p = 0.003, CI:[-0.326;-0.069]) and profit
(-0.154, p = 0.000, CI:[-0.247;-0.069]). This effect on profit is partially mediated by proportion
of cooperative communication (-0.034, p = 0.050, CI:[-0.099;0.000]). The significantly lower
Table 4. Mediation analyses.
Panel A–SEM direct, indirect and total effects Game I
Variables Model I
Prop_coop_com
Direct effect
Profit
Direct effect
Profit
Indirect effect
Profit
Total effect
coef. p coef. p coef. p coef. p
Initial experience -0.076 0.038 -0.060 0.008 -0.020 0.028 -0.079 0.002
Prop_coop_com 0.260 0.000 0.260 0.000
Panel B–SEM direct, indirect and total effects Game II
Variables Model II
Perception
behavior partner
game I
Direct effect
Prop_coop_com
Direct effect
Prop_coop_com
Indirect effect
Profit
Direct effect
Profit
Indirect effect
Profit
Total effect
coef. p coef. p coef. p coef. p coef. p coef. p
Initial experience -1.649 0.001 0.031 0.490 -0.022 0.120 0.004 0.859 -0.007 0.601 -0.003 0.993
Subsequent experience -0.123 0.783 -0.011 0.844 -0.002 0.548 0.026 0.296 -0.003 0.687 0.023 0.389
Initial experience x Subsequent experience 0.526 0.402 -0.198 0.003 0.007 0.245 -0.120 0.007 -0.034 0.050 -0.154 0.000
Perception behavior partner game I 0.013 0.165 0.005 0.421 0.003 0.081 0.008 0.245
Prop_coop_com 0.191 0.009 0.191 0.009
Panel C–SEM direct, indirect and total effects Game III
Variables Model III
Perception
behavior partner
game I
Direct effect
Perception
behavior partner
game II
Direct effect
Prop_coop_com
Direct effect
Prop_coop_com
Indirect effect
Profit
Direct effect
Profit
Indirect effect
Profit
Total effect
coef. p coef. p coef. p coef. p coef. p coef. p coef. p
Initial experience -1.649 0.001 0.307 0.298 0.021 0.651 -0.018 0.382 -0.038 0.308 -0.021 0.170 -0.059 0.117
Subsequent experience -0.123 0.783 -1.021 0.005 0.054 0.218 -0.047 0.005 -0.079 0.015 -0.009 0.509 -0.088 0.006
Initial experience x Subsequent experience 0.526 0.402 -0.971 0.053 -0.046 0.455 -0.032 0.186 0.026 0.602 -0.013 0.445 0.014 0.804
Perception behavior partner game I 0.120 0.116 0.014 0.152 0.005 0.083 0.014 0.060 0.004 0.032 0.018 0.017
Perception behavior partner game II 0.043 0.001 0.008 0.267 0.007 0.003 0.015 0.027
Prop_coop_com 0.156 0.005 0.156 0.005
The fit indices for Model 1 are χ2/df (0.006/1) = 0.006, CFI = 1.00, NFI = 1.00, and RMSEA = 0.00. The fit indices for Model 2 are χ2/df (0.253/3) = 0.084, CFI = 1.00,
NFI = 0.99, and RMSEA = 0.00. The fit indices for Model 3 are χ2/df (0.253/3) = 0.084, CFI = 1.000, NFI = 0.999, and RMSEA = 0.00. Cell statistics are the
unstandardized coefficient estimates and two-tailed p-values. We used 5000 Maximum Likelihood (ML) Bootstraps to calculate 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals.
All three models include the covariate Part-time.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213038.t004
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Table 5. Results on profits for partnering treatments game II.
Panel A–Descriptive statistics
Initial experience
Single partner Different partners
Subsequent experience
Round Single partner
(n = 35)
Different partners
(n = 42)
Single partner
(n = 41)
Different partners
(n = 42)
8 0,789 0,800 0,785 0,683
9 0,773 0,815 0,820 0,694
10 0,786 0,921 0,761 0,627
11 0,890 0,860 0,826 0,721
12 0,862 0,918 0,852 0,788
13 0,903 0,873 0,934 0,680
14 0,940 0,903 0,930 0,782
Standardized game profit 0,849
(0,176)
0,870
(0,104)
0,844
(0,151)
0,711
(0,169)
Proportion cooperative communication 0,846
(0,216)
0,834
(0,191)
0,852
(0,182)
0,647
(0,251)
Perception behavior partner 6,40
(1,459)
5,36
(1,923)
6,49
(0,978)
4,52
(2,144)
Time used for decision making 382,34
(152,94)
560,45
(126,39)
503,34
(192,10)
590,71
(139,79)
Panel B–Repeated measures ANOVA on Game II profits
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p
Between Subjects
Initial experience 1,820 1 1,820 12,777 0,000
Subsequent experience 0,770 1 0,770 5,405 0,021
Initial experience x Subsequent experience 1,706 1 1,706 11,978 0,001
Error 22,082 155
Within Subjects effects
Round 1,571 5,714 0,275 4,487 0,000
Round x Initial experience 0,371 5,714 0,065 1,060 0,384
Round x Subsequent experience 0,601 5,714 0,105 1,716 0,118
Round x Initial experience x Subsequent experience 0,291 5,714 0,051 0,830 0,542
Error (rounds) 54,277 885,619
Covariate
Part_time 2,999 1 2,999 21,051 0,000
Panel C—Simple effects test (Bonferroni adjusted) on Game II profits
Initial experience Subsequent experience Subsequent experience Mean difference (p-value)
Single partner Single partner
(0,849)
Different partners
(0,870)
-0,021 (0,547)
Different partners Single partner
(0,844)
Different partners
(0,711)
0,133 (0,000)
Subsequent experience Initial experience Initial experience Mean difference
Single partner Single partner
(0,849)
Different partners
(0,844)
0,005 (0,886)
Different partners Single partner
(0,870)
Different partners
(0,711)
0,159 (0,000)
In Panel A, the cells contain information regarding the number of individuals per condition (n), the average scores, and (standard deviation). The p-values reported in
Panel B and Panel C are two-tailed.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213038.t005
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profits of participants with initial and subsequent interactions with different partners are
partly explained by their lower use of cooperative communication. Together, these results sup-
port hypothesis 2b.
In game three we do not find a significant interaction between participants’ initial experi-
ence and subsequent experience. The main effects for initial experience (F = 4.966, p = 0.027)
and subsequent experience (F = 11.351, p = 0.001) are significant (Table 6, Panel B). The
results show that participants interacting with a single partner perform significantly better
than participants who interact with different partners (marginal means 0.776 vs. 0.692), and
participants who initially interacted with a single partner perform better than participants who
initially interacted with different partners (marginal means 0.761 vs. 0.707). Given that
ANOVA lacks power for detecting an ordinal interaction [72], we performed an additional
one-way ANOVA with standardized game profits as dependent variable and treatment group
(4-levels) as between-subjects factor and performed post hoc analyses with Bonferroni correc-
tion to test for significance of pairwise comparisons. In this analysis we again use the average
profit across the rounds in the game per subject as one independent observation.
Results in Panel C of Table 6 show that participants who interacted with different partners
in each game have the worst performance (0.669), however their profits in this game are not
significantly lower compared to participants who had initial interactions with a single partner
and subsequent interactions with different partners (0.716). This implies that an initially
learned cooperative routine is gradually replaced by a more competitive attitude and partici-
pants start to protect themselves against opportunistic behavior of partners when transaction
conditions increase exposure risks. Participants who interacted with a single partner during
each game, perform significantly better than participants in both treatment groups of subse-
quently different partners (0.807 vs. 0.716, p = 0.082; 0.807 vs. 0.669, p = 0.001). If participants
initially interacted with different partners and subsequently with a single partner, they do not
perform significantly better than both treatment groups of subsequently different partners
(0.745 vs. 0.716, p = 1.000; 0.745 vs. 0.669, p = 0.180). This result is in line with our expectation
in hypothesis 3a and can be explained by how fast participants in these treatment groups adapt
their investment in cooperation. While participants who interacted with a single partner dur-
ing each game start their first round of the game with an average cooperative investment of
107 (profit of 0.569), they increase this to 117 in the two following rounds, resulting in average
profits of 0.727 and 0.863 and even higher in later rounds. Participants who initially interacted
with different partners and subsequently with a single partner however start with an average
cooperative investment of 106 (profit of 0.593) and this remains relatively stable (110 and 107)
in the two following rounds. One of the reasons for this can be that participants who interacted
with a single partner during each game have cooperative perceptions about partners and there-
fore blame cooperative failure to the characteristics of the new environment. On the other
hand, participants who had variety in initial experiences are more likely to blame failure to
opportunistic behavior of their partner as their initial experience created skepticism about
cooperative intentions of partners. Although the proportion of cooperative communication
has a positive and significant influence on profits in game three (total effect 0.156, p = 0.005,
CI:[0.048;0.286]), we do not find a significant direct effect of either the type of initial and sub-
sequent partnering experience on the proportion of cooperative communication, nor an indi-
rect effect on profit. The same applies for the interaction effect. We do find that perceived
cooperativeness of the partner in game one has a significant total effect on profit in game 3
(0.018, p = 0.017, CI:[0.003;0.033]), with a significant direct and indirect effect. This also sup-
ports our argument that perceived behavior of prior partners can be decisive for how individu-
als attribute cooperation outcomes in subsequent interactions and their willingness to increase
cooperative commitment when transaction conditions increase exposure risks.
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Table 6. Results on profits for partnering treatments game III.
Panel A–Descriptive statistics
Initial experience
Single partner Different partners
Subsequent experience
Round Single partner
(n = 35)
Different partners
(n = 42)
Single partner
(n = 41)
Different partners
(n = 42)
15 0,569 0,530 0,593 0,499
16 0,727 0,655 0,667 0,609
17 0,863 0,754 0,641 0,655
18 0,755 0,698 0,776 0,637
19 0,929 0,779 0,836 0,754
20 0,931 0,791 0,842 0,766
21 0,876 0,803 0,861 0,761
Standardized game profit 0,807
(0,157)
0,716
(0,149)
0,745
(0,189)
0,669
(0,142)
Proportion cooperative communication 0,792
(0,223)
0,798
(0,204)
0,793
(0,254)
0,723
(0,223)
Perception behavior partner 6,07
(1,420)
4,77
(2,093)
5,65
(1,865)
4,58
(1,905)
Time used for decision making 354,29
(145,19)
443,52
(136,43)
408,76
(146,50)
486,37
(140,40)
Panel B–Repeated measures ANOVA on Game III profits
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p
Between Subjects
Initial experience 0,799 1 0,799 4,966 0,027
Subsequent experience 1,827 1 1,827 11,351 0,001
Initial experience x Subsequent experience 0,010 1 0,010 0,060 0,807
Error 25,112 156 0,161
Within Subjects effects
Round 9,479 5,953 1,592 19,969 0,000
Round x Initial experience 0,626 5,953 0,105 1,318 0,246
Round x Subsequent experience 0,157 5,953 0,026 0,332 0,919
Round x Initial experience x Subsequent experience 0,330 5,953 0,055 0,694 0,653
Error (rounds) 74,054 928,656
Covariate
Part_time 3,093 1 3,093 19,214 0,000
Panel C—Post-hoc comparison (Bonferroni adjusted) on Game III profits
Partnering group Partnering group
Initial experience Subsequent experience Initial experience Subsequent experience Mean difference (p-
value)
Single partner Single partner Single partner Different partners 0,0915 (0,082)
Different partners Same partner 0,0618 (0,575)
Different partners Different partners 0,1384 (0,001)
Different partners Single partner Single partner Different partners 0,0297 (1,000)
Different partners Different partners 0,0766 (0,180)
Single partner Different partners Different partners Different partners 0,0489 (1,000)
In Panel A, the cells contain information regarding the number of individuals per condition (n), the average scores, and (standard deviation). The p-values reported in
Panel B and Panel C are two-tailed.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213038.t006
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Conclusion
Decision-making environments that individuals encounter in practice are far from stable.
Interdependence structures between individuals change over time, caused by corporate
restructuring, downsizing, voluntary career movement or reassignment of tasks. In addition,
tasks often differ in complexity while changing consumer preferences, new government regu-
lations, or new technologies can also require changes in decision practices to succeed. The abil-
ity to take what has been learned and apply it in a related context with other individuals is thus
an integral aspect of individual learning and behavioral spillovers. We consider this sequential
behavior and specifically examine how individuals respond to respectively a lower provision
threshold and a higher provision threshold when they encounter a new interdependence struc-
ture and whether their behavior differs depending on their prior interdependence structure.
The experimental results support our thesis that the type of experience individuals have mat-
ters for how they respond to changing circumstances in subsequent interdependent interac-
tions with unfamiliar individuals and hence affects their ability to efficiently respond to
dynamics in their decision-making environment.
Theoretical implications
Our findings contribute to the literature on individual learning and behavioral spillovers. Our
findings suggest that the ability to develop a norm of cooperation with unfamiliar partners is
path dependent and influenced by environmental conditions. Once cooperative norms have
been routinized in the interaction style of individuals, they seem to become more resilient to
shocks. If partners do not have any prior relationship together but use the cooperative routines
they both have established before, a failure is more easily forgiven and blamed to the encoun-
tered conditions of the task environment. Prior experience thus allows for the establishment of
social norms of cooperation which can subsequently mitigate behavioral uncertainty with
other individuals. However, environmental conditions affect the ability to transfer established
social norms of cooperation to subsequent interactions. A change to a context of higher behav-
ioral uncertainty does not affect performance of individuals that learned to cooperate with
someone else when it is less difficult to achieve cooperative success (and individuals thus have
a low exposure risk), but an initially learned cooperative norm is gradually replaced by a more
competitive attitude when behavioral uncertainty is high and individuals interact in a setting
that makes cooperative success more difficult to achieve (and thus imply high exposure risks).
Together, these results show how cooperative decisions can be shaped by both incentives and
the broader behavioral context of individuals and enhance understanding of the persistence of
cooperative spillover effects across different settings. This identification of contextual condi-
tions that support the realization of the potential value of experience moves forward the speci-
fication of when different types and combinations of experience have positive or negative
effects on learning outcomes in both the short and longer term. This can further offer prescrip-
tions on how to structure organizational work activities, both within and between firms.
Practical implications
Cooperation is a central concern for many managers. Our results can create awareness for
managers about spillover effects in the assignment of work activities to employees. The order
of settings that individuals encounter is often a choice variable, as organizations can structure
the work environment of their employees. Considering the sequences of interaction settings
helps to understand how assignment of tasks with varying complexity and interdependence
structures could be designed in order to improve performance. Our results could also have
practical implications for managers responsible for joint ventures or alliances, who are
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concerned about being exploited by partners. The key characteristic of collaborative partner-
ships centers on the cooperation of individuals across firm boundaries. Casting these coopera-
tive relationships as social dilemmas, our results highlight the importance of initial interaction
structures between individuals for managing fears of exploitation by others over time.
Limitations and future research
This study is subject to several limitations that provide opportunities for future research. First,
experiments enable to test the impact of specific mechanisms while controlling for factors that
confound with these mechanisms in real-world settings. But a laboratory is also more abstract
and less realistic than a real-world situation. For instance, deceptive behavior may be easier
when communication is not face-to-face, as in our experiment. On the other hand, this may
also signal that greater reliance on technology-mediated communication can increase uncer-
tainty about intentions and behavior of others, and as such lower trust development. Second,
variety in the degree and type of prior experience of the partners involved in a dyad can result
in differences on what has been learned by partners in the past, which can affect subsequent
cooperative dynamics. Lastly, examining how information regarding the reputation of partners
influences partner selection and subsequent cooperative performance would also be an inter-
esting avenue for future research.
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